The December 2021 AWS us-east-1 Outage: How an Automated Scaling Event Congested the Internal Network
An automated scaling activity in AWS us-east-1 triggered internal network congestion that cascaded into widespread service degradation across dozens of AWS services for roughly 7 hours.
Networking & APIs · advanced · 12 min read · 2255 words · By Sandip Das · Published
Public postmortem: based on what the organisation published. Sources are listed below.
What this covers
- Background
- What Happened
- Root Cause
- Detection and Response
- Impact
- The Fix
- Lessons for Your Team
- Apply It Yourself
Key numbers
| Metric | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Incident duration (onset to broad recovery) | Normal operations | Approximately 7 hours of degraded availability |
| AWS services impacted in us-east-1 | All services operational | EC2, Lambda, ECS, EKS, Kinesis, CloudWatch, EventBridge, ELB, and others degraded |
| Service Health Dashboard lag | Expected to reflect real-time status | Dashboard lagged significantly behind actual customer impact, acknowledged by AWS |
Key components
- AWS Auto Scaling Service — Initiated the automated scaling activity that triggered the connection surge on the internal network.
- Internal Network Fabric (us-east-1) — The shared network infrastructure whose connection-tracking capacity was overwhelmed by the scaling event, causing broad congestion.
- Amazon Kinesis Data Streams — A foundational service impaired by the congestion; its degradation had second-order effects on Lambda async invocations and CloudWatch metric delivery.
- Amazon CloudWatch — The primary observability service for AWS customers, which was itself degraded during the incident, hampering detection and response.
- AWS Service Health Dashboard — The public-facing status page that lagged behind actual impact, prompting AWS to commit to communication improvements.
- Connection storm / thundering herd pattern — The failure mode where simultaneous connection establishment by many new nodes overwhelms stateful network devices, the core mechanism of this incident.
Background
On December 7, 2021, a significant portion of AWS infrastructure in the us-east-1 region experienced degraded performance and availability across a wide range of services. The incident affected not only direct AWS customers running workloads in the region but also a large number of downstream consumer applications and SaaS products that depend on AWS services — including Amazon's own internal services such as the Alexa voice platform, Ring doorbells, and Amazon.com itself.
us-east-1 (Northern Virginia) is AWS's oldest and most heavily utilised region, and it hosts a disproportionate share of globally critical infrastructure. Many AWS control-plane services — the APIs and orchestration layers that manage resources across all regions — are centralised there. This makes us-east-1 failures uniquely broad in their blast radius: a problem in us-east-1 can degrade the ability of customers to manage resources even in other regions.
The public postmortem for this event was published by AWS at aws.amazon.com/message/12721/.
The rest of this case study — the trade-offs, the scaling numbers and the build prompt — is available to LearnXops members. Create an account or see membership.
Sources
Topics: aws, networking, incident-response, auto-scaling, postmortem, cloud-reliability
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